Examines how various European nations combat Russian disinformation through state and NGO efforts.
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The article discusses the manipulation through online means, particularly concerning election periods, and presents examples of state actions globally. It highlights a TikTok campaign spreading pro-Russian and anti-EU messages targeting Romanians, which led to the Romanian National Audiovisual Council (CNA) investigating the content for disinformation. Furthermore, investigations revealed that former presidential candidate Cฤlin Georgescu’s rise was influenced by online disinformation campaigns funded partly through AdNow, a company linked to the Kremlin, and TikTok reports showing false accounts targeting AUR and Georgescu in Romania’s 2024 election. Regarding institutional responses, Romania lacks specific anti-propaganda legislation, though a proposed law was abandoned; state bodies like the Ministry of National Defence’s InfoRadar monitor Russian disinformation. Estonia actively combats Russian propaganda through police action, expelling propagandists, and involving NGOs. Lithuania utilizes its Armed Forces’ Strategic Communication Department to monitor hostile media. Poland has no constant state body against disinformation, relying on ad-hoc measures. Bulgaria shows institutional hesitation despite being highly vulnerable to Russian propaganda, with efforts largely driven by NGOs. Moldova established a Strategic Communication and Disinformation Countering Center in 2023. The text concludes by noting the PULSE project, an EU initiative promoting cross-border journalistic partnerships.
