Romanian social media faces growing Russian propaganda amid elections; compares responses to Estonia and Hungary’s situation.
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Romanian social media users have recently been exposed to alarming content and messages from profiles that abruptly shifted to openly pro-Russian propaganda, including figures suggesting a Putiny-like candidate for Romanian president or claiming they would fight alongside Russia if it attacked the EU. The upcoming election is heavily influenced by this Russian propaganda. Previously, some accounts supported Călin Georgescu, who won the first round of the 2024 presidential election before the results were invalidated by the Constitutional Court due to illegal Russian influence; however, public opinion now favors a far-right candidate, George Simion, in the next election.
Addressing this, Romania has focused on uncovering the origins of autumn campaigns, identifying entities like Adnow that built follower bases with non-political content before suddenly promoting pro-Georgescu messages. Countermeasures are difficult as there is no specific law against online propaganda; a proposed anti-election manipulation law failed, and the government currently emphasizes strict adherence to existing laws. While the Ministry of Defense operates Inforadar to warn users about illegal posts, this only addresses illicit content.
Similar efforts in Estonia and Lithuania involve monitoring social media and notifying platforms, with specialized police or military units involved; these countries also focus on blocking Russian state broadcasters and cracking down on domestic propaganda. Poland has a temporary program for reporting disinformation during elections but lacks a dedicated oversight body. Bulgaria remains vulnerable due to political instability preventing effective programs. Austria sees increased fake news from right-wing sources, with official bodies providing information and fact-checking services.
Experts note that Russian propaganda is particularly active in Hungarian social media, especially regarding Ukraine; however, the government permits its presence on the Hungarian media market, viewing it as freedom of the press, even while other forms of anti-Ukrainian propaganda are present.
